

**Winter Term 2024/25**

**University of Cologne, Faculty of Management, Economics and Social Sciences**

**Cologne Center for Comparative Politics (CCCP)**

**Chair of International Comparative Political Economy and Economic Sociology (Liaison Chair to the Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies)**

**Doctoral & Master Course: Who Rules the Economy? The Political Economy of Labor and Business Power**

**ECTS: 6 ECTS (2021 examination regulations)**

**Instructor:** Prof. Dr. Christine Trampusch

**Email:** christine.trampusch@uni-koeln.de

**Phone:** 0221 470 8807

**Office Hours:** By appointment! Please write an email to: christine.trampusch@uni-koeln.de

**Time: Tuesday, 4pm-5.30pm, weekly Oct. 8 to Dec. 10, Mini-Conference Friday, Jan. 24, 9am-5.30pm. Location: IBW-Building, Room 3.40.**

**Course Description:** Who rules the economy? Comparative political economy comprises the analysis of the power relationship between labor and capital. Do both have the same amount of political power? How can labor and business power (resources) be measured? How do labor and business influence public policies at the national and international level? How are labor and business power affected by mega trends such as economic globalization, de-industrialization, financialization and digitalization? On the basis of conceptual papers and empirical studies, this course discusses theories and concepts for the comparative analysis of labor and business power. As the seminar's overarching goal is to enable participants to write their own research papers on labor or business influence based on the concepts introduced and discussed in class, regular attendance is of utmost importance for the quality of term papers. All texts are available on the ILIAS-website of the course.

**Requirements and evidence of academic achievement:**

Participants are expected to hand in a two-page outline of their planned term papers before January 17, 2025 (8am Deadline!). This outline will be discussed in our mini-conference on research projects on January 24, 2025. To prepare your outlines and the mini-conference, we will have one research discussion zoom meeting on December 10.

**Final grading** is based on **individual summaries** (which means a summary and review of the respective paper; see syllabus "summary" to be submitted until Friday, 8am before the respective session) and the **term paper** in which the participants investigate an empirical research question, adopting theories and concepts of this class (handed in on March 1, 2025, 8am). The **final grading** is as follows: **30% individual summary; 70% term paper**. Students must fulfill both assignments as requirement.

**Students are expected to:** attend sessions regularly, actively contribute to class discussions, complete assigned readings according to schedule: "compulsory reading" – all students read; "presentation" – only reading by the respective presenter; write a term paper of not more than 10,000 words, own research on literature/data/material is required. All papers will be checked for plagiarism. Term papers have to be written in English language. Since all reading assignments are in English, this will be the general classroom language as well. Participants therefore must know enough English to be able to participate actively. Perfection is not required – you just need to understand and make yourself understood.

08.10	<p style="text-align: center;"><b><u>Introduction &amp; Basics</u></b></p> <p><b>Compulsory reading:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Pierson, P. (2016). Power in Historical Institutionalism. In O. Fioretos, T.G. Falleti &amp; A. Sheingate (eds), <i>The Oxford Handbook of Historical Institutionalism</i> (pp. 124-141). Oxford University Press.</li> <li>• Weber, M. (1978). Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretative Sociology. 16. Power and Domination. In G. Roth &amp; C. Wittich (eds), <i>Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretative Sociology</i> (pp. 53-54). University of California Press.</li> <li>• Dür, A. (2008). Measuring Interest Group Influence in the EU: A Note on Methodology. <i>European Union Politics</i>, 9(4), 559-576.</li> </ul>
15.10	<p style="text-align: center;"><b><u>Labor Power</u></b></p> <p><b>Compulsory reading:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Korpi, W. (1983). <i>The Democratic Class Struggle</i>. Routledge &amp; Kegan Paul. 1-6, 7-25, 184-207.</li> </ul> <p><b>Summary_1_NN:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Huber, E., Huo, J. &amp; Stephens, J. D. (2019). Power, Policy, and Top Income Shares. <i>Socio-Economic Review</i>, 17(2), 231–253.</li> </ul> <p><b>Summary_2_NN:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Rathgeb, P. &amp; Klitgaard, M. B. (2022). Protagonists or Consenters: Radical Right Parties and Attacks on Trade Unions. <i>Journal of European Public Policy</i>, 29(7), 1049-1071.</li> </ul>
22.10	<p style="text-align: center;"><b><u>Business Power</u></b></p> <p><b>Compulsory reading:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Culpepper, P.D. (2010). <i>Quiet Politics and Business Power: Corporate Control in Europe and Japan</i>. Cambridge University Press. 177-198.</li> <li>• Culpepper, P.D. (2015). Structural Power and Political Science in the Post-Crisis Era. <i>Business and Politics</i>, 17(3), 391-409.</li> <li>• Culpepper, P.D. (2021). Quiet Politics in Tumultuous Times: Business Power, Populism, and Democracy. <i>Politics &amp; Society</i>, 49(1), 133-143.</li> </ul> <p><b>Summary_3_NN:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Culpepper, P.D. &amp; Reinke, R. (2014). Structural Power and Bank Bailouts in the United Kingdom and the United States. <i>Politics &amp; Society</i>, 42(4), 427-454.</li> </ul> <p><b>Summary_4_NN:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Feldmann, M. &amp; Morgan, G. (2021). Brexit and British Business Elites: Business Power and Noisy Politics. <i>Politics &amp; Society</i>, 49(1), 107-131.</li> </ul>
29.10	<p style="text-align: center;"><b><u>State Power</u></b></p> <p><b>Compulsory reading:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Mann, M. (1984). The Autonomous Power of the State: Its Origins, Mechanisms and Results. <i>European Journal of Sociology</i>, 25(2), 185-213.</li> <li>• Barnett, M. &amp; Duvall, R. (2005). Power in International Politics. <i>International Organization</i>, 59(1), 39-75.</li> </ul> <p><b>Summary_5_NN:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Farrell, H. &amp; Newman, A. L. (2019). Weaponized Interdependence: How Global Economic Networks Shape State Coercion. <i>International Security</i>, 44(1), 42-79.</li> </ul> <p><b>Summary_6_NN:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Walter, M. F. &amp; Trampusch, C. (2024). Economic Statecraft by Design and by Default: The Political Economy of the 5G-Huawei Bans in the United States, United Kingdom and Germany. <i>Competition &amp; Change</i>; forthcoming.</li> </ul>

05.11	<p style="text-align: center;"><b><u>Lobbying &amp; EU Policy Making</u></b></p> <p><b>Compulsory reading:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Buena, A. &amp; Ibenskas, R. (2015). Quantitative Text Analysis and the Study of EU Lobbying and Interest Groups. <i>European Union Politics</i>, 16(3), 429-455.</li> <li>• Klüver, H. (2015). The Promises of Quantitative Text Analysis in Interest Group Research: A Reply to Bunea and Ibenskas. <i>European Union Politics</i>, 16(3), 456-466.</li> </ul> <p><b>Summary_11_NN:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Kalyanpur, N., Newman, A. L. (2019). The MNC-Coalition Paradox: Issue Salience, Foreign Firms and the General Data Protection Regulation. <i>Journal of Common Market Studies</i>, 57(3), 448-467.</li> </ul> <p><b>Summary_12_NN:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• De Bruycker, I. &amp; Beyers, J. (2019). Lobbying Strategies and Success: Inside and Outside Lobbying in European Union Legislative Politics. <i>European Political Science Review</i>, 11(1), 57-74.</li> </ul>
12.11	<p style="text-align: center;"><b><u>Power &amp; Finance</u></b></p> <p><b>Compulsory reading:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Young, K. (2015). Not by Structure Alone: Power, Prominence, and Agency in American Finance. <i>Business and Politics</i>, 17(3), 443-472.</li> </ul> <p><b>Summary_13_NN:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Trampusch, C. &amp; Fastenrath, F. (2021). States' Interests as Limits to the Power of Finance: Regulatory Reforms in Early Local Government. <i>Regulation &amp; Governance</i>, 15(2), 245-261.</li> </ul> <p><b>Summary_14_NN:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Young, K. L., Marple, T. &amp; Heilman, J. (2017). Beyond the Revolving Door: Advocacy Behavior and Social Distance to Financial Regulators. <i>Business and Politics</i>, 19(2), 327-364.</li> </ul>
19.11	<p style="text-align: center;"><b><u>Power &amp; Financialization</u></b></p> <p><b>Compulsory reading:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Wittko, C. (2016). The Politics of Financialization in the United States, 1949-2005. <i>British Journal of Political Science</i>, 46(2), 349-370.</li> </ul> <p><b>Summary_15_NN:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Meyer, B. (2019). Financialization, Technological Change, and Trade Union Decline. <i>Socio-Economic Review</i>, 17(3), 477-502.</li> </ul> <p><b>Summary_16_NN:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Doose, H. (2024). Losing Ground: Business power, Standardized Assets and the Regulation of Land Acquisition Taxes in Germany and Sweden. <i>Socio-Economic Review</i>, online first.</li> </ul>
26.11	<p style="text-align: center;"><b><u>Power &amp; Digitalization I</u></b></p> <p><b>Compulsory reading:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Rahman, K.S &amp; Thelen, K. (2019). The Rise of the Platform Business Model and the Transformation of Twenty-First-Century Capitalism. <i>Politics &amp; Society</i>, 47(2), 177-204.</li> </ul> <p><b>Summary_17_NN</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Schwan, M., Trampusch, C. &amp; Horn, J. (2024). How Industry 4.0 Inc. Shakes the Supremacy of Top Dogs: The Digital Transformation of German Industry and New Corporate Networks; currently under review.</li> </ul> <p><b>Summary_18_NN:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Kemmerling, M. &amp; Trampusch, C. (2023). Digital Power Resources (DPR): The Political Economy of Structural and Infrastructural Business Power in Digital(ized) Capitalism. <i>Socio-Economic Review</i>, 21(4), 1851-1876.</li> </ul>

03.12	<p style="text-align: center;"><b><u>Power &amp; Digitalization II</u></b></p> <p><b>Compulsory reading:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Culpepper, P.D. &amp; Thelen, K. (2020). Are We All Amazon Primed? Consumers and the Politics of Platform Power. <i>Comparative Political Studies</i>, 53(2), 288-318.</li> </ul> <p><b>Summary_19_NN:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Trampusch, C. (2024). Regulating the Digital Economy: Heterogenous Business Preferences in Data Governance. <i>Journal of European Public Policy</i>, 31(7), 1902-1926.</li> </ul> <p><b>Summary_20_NN:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Helmerich, N., Raj-Reichert, G. &amp; Zajak, S. (2021). Exercising Associational and Networked power through the Use of Digital Technology by Workers in Global Value Chains. <i>Competition &amp; Change</i>, 25(2), 142-166.</li> </ul>
10.12	<p style="text-align: center;"><b><u>Preparation of Mini Conference <span style="background-color: yellow;">VIA ZOOM</span>: Discussion of your first ideas on your research project (term paper)</u></b></p>
24.01	<p style="text-align: center;"><b>Mini Conference Friday, January 24, 9am-5.30pm IBW-Building, Room 3.40</b></p>