

Winter Term 2021/22

Dr. Düzgün Arslantaş

14335.0102, Comparative Political Institutions (6 ECTS)

Time: Monday 12:00 – 13:30

Room: IBW Building / Lecture hall H114

First Session: 11 October 2021

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Office hours by appointment

Office: IBW Building, Herbert-Lewin-Str. 2, Room 1.13b

Course description

This is an introductory course for the field of comparative political institutions on the MA level. We proceed along fundamental analytical questions: Why do institutions matter? Why do they change and in which way? What are their effects on political actors, political processes, and policymaking? To answer questions like these, the most relevant analytical concepts will be introduced: institutional equilibria and equilibrium institutions; institutional design, institutional change, and endogenous institutions; path dependence; preference aggregation, co-ordination, collective action, and principal-agent relations; veto player theory and types of democracy. The conceptual overview will be followed by applications towards the distinction between autocracy and democracy, democratization, and development.

Prerequisites

A good knowledge of general political science concepts, theories, and basic quantitative and qualitative methods is required. Students should have completed a course on statistics prior to this course so that a basic familiarity with quantitative methods, in particular linear regression analysis, can be expected. Students should be able to understand and articulate themselves in English as this will be the general classroom language. Of course, perfection is not required but you should be able to make yourself understood.

Relevance for study programs

The course is open to master students of the WiSo-Faculty with an interest in political science. It will be offered in the “**BM Comparative Political Institutions**” (For further information please confer the Modulhandbuch).

Registration

The course will be taught on a weekly basis (first session October 11). Registration takes place via **KLIPS**. I strongly recommend registration as this ensures that you may get information about ad hoc changes in the schedule.

Exam

Written Test (60 minutes)

Reading assignments

The required reading is indicated as such, but you will also find *recommended* readings which are not required for class. The recommended readings list only serves as orientation in case that you intend to delve deeper into the particular research topic. All required texts for the sessions of the seminar can be found on **ILIAS**.

Most texts can only be accessed from within the **UKLAN** network of the University of Cologne. If you do not know how to obtain access to UKLAN, please consult the **RRZK's** websites: <http://rrzk.uni-koeln.de/netzzugang.html?&L=1>

Basic reading recommendations:

- Kaiser, André. (2007) “Neuere Beiträge zur Empirischen Institutionenanalyse: Von der Gegenstands- zur Problemorientierung”, *Politische Vierteljahresschrift*, 48: 119- 135.
- Lijphart, Arend. (2012) *Patterns of Democracy. Government Forms and Performance in Thirty-Six Countries*, New Haven/London, second edition.
- Tsebelis, George. (2002) *Veto Players. How Political Institutions Work*, Princeton, NJ.

Schedule

1) 11 October 2021 – Introduction

Required readings:

- Przeworski, Adam. (2004) “Institutions Matter?”, *Government and Opposition*, 39: 527- 40.
- Hall, Peter A., and Rosemary C.R. Taylor. (1996) “Political Science and the Three New Institutionalisms”, *Political Studies*, 44: 936-57.
- Carey, John M. (2000) “Parchment, Equilibria, and Institutions”, *Comparative Political Studies* 33: 735-61.

Recommended readings:

- North, Douglass C. (1991) “Institutions”, *Journal of Economic Perspectives*, 5: 97-112.
- Thelen, Kathleen. (1999) “Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Politics”, *Annual Review of Political Science*, 2: 369-404.

2) 18 October 2021 – Rational Choice Institutionalism

Required readings:

- Opp, K-D. (1999) “Contending Conceptions of the Theory of Rational Action”, *Journal of Theoretical Politics*, 11: 171-202.
- Shepsle, Kenneth A. (2006) “Rational Choice Institutionalism”. In *The Oxford Handbook of Political Institutions*, edited by R. A. W. Rhodes, Sarah A. Binder and Bert A. Rockman, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 23-38.
- Diermeier, Daniel, and Keith Krehbiel. (2003) “Institutionalism as a Methodology”, *Journal of Theoretical Politics* 15: 123-44.

3) 25 October 2021 – Structure-Induced Equilibrium

Required readings:

- Shepsle, Ken and Barry Weingast. (1981) “Structure-Induced Equilibrium and Legislative Choice.” *Public Choice*, 37: 503-19.
- Riker, William H. (1980) “Implications from the Disequilibrium of Majority Rule for the Study of Institutions” *American Political Science Review* 74: 432-446.
- Baron, David P., and John A. Ferejohn. (1989) “Bargaining in Legislatures”, *American Political Science Review* 83: 1181-1206.

Recommended readings:

- Shepsle, Ken. 1979. “Institutional Arrangements and Equilibrium in Multidimensional Voting Models”, *American Journal of Political Science* 23: 27-59.

4) 8 November 2021 – Institutional Design and Path Dependence

Required readings:

- Pierson, Paul. (2000) “Increasing Returns, Path Dependence, and the Study of Politics”, *American Political Science Review* 94: 251-67.
- Pierson, Paul. (2000) “The Limits of Design: Explaining Institutional Origins and Change”, *Governance*, Vol. 13: 475-499.

Recommended readings:

- Bennett, Andrew and Colin Elman. (2006) “Complex Causal Relations and Case Study Methods: The Example of Path Dependence”, *Political Analysis*, Vol. 14: 250-267
- Pierson, Paul. (2003) “Big, Slow-Moving, and ... Invisible”. In *Comparative Historical Analysis in the Social Sciences*, edited by James Mahoney and Dietrich Rueschemeyer, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 177-207.

5) 15 November 2021 – Institutional Change

Required readings:

- Greif, Avner and David Laitin. (2004) “A Theory of Endogenous Institutional Change.” *American Political Science Review*, 98: 633-52.
- Rixen, Thomas and Lora Anne Viola (2015) “Putting Path Dependence in Its Place: Toward a Taxonomy of Institutional Change”. *Journal of Theoretical Politics*, 27: 301- 323.
- Streeck, Wolfgang, and Kathleen Thelen. (2005) “Introduction: Institutional Change in Advanced Political Economies”. In *Beyond Continuity. Institutional Change in Advanced Political Economies*, edited by Wolfgang Streeck and Kathleen Thelen, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1-39.

6) 22 November 2021 – Preference Aggregation: The Effects of Electoral Systems

Required readings:

- Cox, Gary W. (1999) “Electoral Rules and Electoral Coordination”, *Annual Review of Political Science* 2: 145-61.
- Colomer, Josep M. (2005) “It's Parties That Choose Electoral Systems (or, Duverger's Laws Upside Down)”, *Political Studies* 53: 1-21.

7) 29 November 2021 – Collective Action

Required readings:

- Olson, Mancur. (1965) *The Logic of Collective Action. Public Goods and the Theory of Groups*. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1-65.
- Hardin, Garrett. (1968) "The Tragedy of the Commons", *Science* 162: 1243-48.735-61.

8) 6 December 2021 – Common Pool Resources

Required readings:

- Ostrom, Elinor. (1990) *Governing the Commons*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 58-102.
- Ostrom, Elinor. (1998) "A Behavioral Approach to the Rational Choice Theory of Collective Action", *American Political Science Review* 92: 1-22.

9) 13 December 2021 – Principal-Agent Relations

Required readings:

- Lupia, Arthur. (2003) "Delegation and Its Perils". In *Delegation and Accountability in Parliamentary Democracies*, edited by Kaare Strøm, Wolfgang C. Müller and Torbjörn Bergman, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 33-54.
- Strøm, Kaare. (2003) "Parliamentary Democracy and Delegation". In *Delegation and Accountability in Parliamentary Democracies*, edited by Kaare Strøm, Wolfgang C. Müller and Torbjörn Bergman, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 55-106.

10) 20 December 2021 – Institutions, Democracy and Autocracy

Required readings:

- Olson, Mancur. (1993) "Dictatorship, Democracy, and Development", *American Political Science Review*, 87: 567-76.
- Acemoglu, Daron and James Robinson. (2006) *Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, chapters 1, 2, and 4.

11) 17 January 2022 – Democratization

Required readings:

- Przeworski, A. and F. Limongi, F. (1997) "Modernization: Theory and Facts", *World Politics* 49: 155-83.
- Boix, Carles and Susan C. Stokes. (2003) "Endogenous Democratization", *World Politics* 55: 517-49.

Recommended readings:

- Lipset, Seymour Martin (1959) "Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy", *American Political Science Review* 53: 69-105.

12) 31 January 2022 - Written Test (60 minutes)

13) Backup I – Institutions and Development

Required readings:

- North, Douglass C. and Barry R. Weingast. (1989) “Constitutions and Commitment: The Evolution of Institutions Governing Public Choice in Seventeenth-Century England”, *Journal of Economic History* 49: 803-32.
- Kuran, Timur. (2004) “Why the Middle East is Economically Underdeveloped: Historical Mechanisms of Institutional Stagnation”, *Journal of Economic Perspectives* 18: 71-90.
- Baum, Matthew A., and David A. Lake. (2003) “The *Political* Economy of Growth: Democracy and Human Capital”, *American Journal of Political Science* 47: 333-47.
- Gerring, John, Strom C. Thacker, and Rodrigo Alfaro. (2012) “Democracy and Human Development”, *Journal of Politics* 74: 1-17.

Recommended readings:

- Ross, Michael L. (2006) “Is Democracy Good for the Poor?”, *American Journal of Political Science* 50: 860-74.

14) Backup II – Types of Democracy & Veto Player Theory

Required readings:

- Lijphart, Arend. (2012) *Patterns of Democracy. Government Forms and Performance in Thirty-Six Countries*, New Haven/London, Second Edition.
- Kaiser, André. (1997) “Types of Democracy. From Classical to New Institutionalism”, *Journal of Theoretical Politics* 9: 419-444.
- Tsebelis, George. (2002) *Veto Players. How Political Institutions Work*, Princeton, NJ.