

Winter Term 2021/22

University of Cologne, Faculty of Management, Economics and Social Sciences

Cologne Center for Comparative Politics (CCCP)

Chair of International Comparative Political Economy and Economic Sociology

Doctoral & Master Course: Who Rules the Economy? The Political Economy of Labor and Business Power

ECTS: 6 ECTS (2021 examination regulations) / 9 ECTS (2015 examination regulations)

Instructor: Prof. Dr. Christine Trampusch

Email: christine.trampusch@uni-koeln.de

Phone: 0221 470 8807

Office Hours: By appointment! Please write an email to: christine.trampusch@uni-koeln.de

**THIS CLASS IS NOT VIRTUAL BUT ONLY ON-SITE AT THE UNIVERSITY!!! ☹️
BUT PLEASE CHECK REGULARLY KLIPS, ILLIAS AND YOUR SMAIL ACCOUNT**

Time: Tuesday, 10.-11.30am, weekly Oct 12 to Dec. 21, Mini-Conference Thursday, Jan. 27, 9am-

4.00pm. Location: Raum S11, (Seminargebäude, [https://verwaltung.uni-](https://verwaltung.uni-koeln.de/abteilung54/content/sachgebiet_4/hoersaele/106_seminargebaeude/s_11/index_ger.ht)

[koeln.de/abteilung54/content/sachgebiet_4/hoersaele/106_seminargebaeude/s_11/index_ger.html](https://verwaltung.uni-koeln.de/abteilung54/content/sachgebiet_4/hoersaele/106_seminargebaeude/s_11/index_ger.html)); on January 27, 2022, Room S15 in the same building.

Course Description: Who rules the economy? Comparative political economy comprises the analysis of the power relationship between labor and capital. Do both have the same amount of political power? How can labor and business power (resources) be measured? How do labor and business influence public policies at the national and international level? How are labor and business power affected by mega trends such as economic globalization, de-industrialization and digitalization? On the basis of conceptual papers and empirical studies, this course discusses theories and concepts for the comparative analysis of labor and business power. As the seminar's overarching goal is to enable participants to write their own research papers on labor or business influence based on the concepts introduced and discussed in class, regular attendance is of utmost importance for the quality of term papers. All texts are available on the ILIAS-website of the course.

Requirements and evidence of academic achievement:

Participants are expected to hand in a two-page outline of their planned term papers before January 21, 2022. This outline will be discussed in our mini-conference on research projects on January 27, 2022. To prepare your outlines and the mini-conference there will be individual office hours in early January.

Final grading is based on **individual summaries** (which means a summary and review of the respective paper; see syllabus "summary", to be submitted until Friday, 8am before the respective session) and the **term paper** in which the participants investigate an empirical research question, adopting theories and concepts of this class (handed in on March 15, 2022, 8am)

Attention: 9 ECTS students (2015 examination regulation) are required to hand in as an additional assignment a short summary of one of the weekly sessions until end of December 2021. It is students' choice which one they select. It should just summarize the main "take aways" of the respective session. The summary on the session will NOT be GRADED.

The **final marking** is as follows: **30% individual summary; 70% term paper**. You have to fulfill both assignments as requirement.

Bonus points: You can earn a bonus of **"0,3"** on your final grade if you hand in **3 questions on the three different mandatory readings** (until Friday 8am before the respective slot).

Students are expected to: attend sessions regularly, actively contribute to class discussions, complete assigned readings according to schedule: "compulsory reading" – all students read; "summary" – only reading by the respective presenter; write a term paper of not more than 10,000 words, own research on literature/data/material is required. All papers will be checked for plagiarism. Term papers have to be written in English language. Since all reading assignments are in English, this will be the general classroom language as well. Participants therefore must know enough English to be able to participate actively. Perfection is not required – you just need to understand and make yourself understood.

<p>12.10 Room S11</p>	<p style="text-align: center;"><u>Introduction & Basics</u></p> <p>Compulsory reading:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Pierson, P. (2016): Power in Historical Institutionalism. In: Fioretos, O., Falleti, T.G., Sheingate, A. (eds): <i>The Oxford Handbook of Historical Institutionalism</i>, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 124-141. • Weber, M. (1978): Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretative Sociology. 16. Power and Domination. In: Roth, G., & Wittich, C. (eds): <i>Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretative Sociology</i>. Berkeley: University of California Press. 53-54. • Dür, A. (2008). Measuring Interest Group Influence in the EU: A Note on Methodology. <i>European Union Politics</i> 9(4), 559-576.
<p>19.10 Room S11</p>	<p style="text-align: center;"><u>Labor Power</u></p> <p>Compulsory reading:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Korpi, W. (1983): <i>The Democratic Class Struggle</i>. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. 1-6, 7-25, 184-207. <p>Presentation_1_NN:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Huber, E., Huo, J., Stephens, J.D. (2019): Power, Policy, and Top Income Shares. <i>Socio-Economic Review</i> 17(2): 231–253. <p>Presentation_2_NN:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Rathgeb, P., Klitgaard, M. B. (2021). Protagonists or Consenters: Radical Right Parties and Attacks on Trade Unions. <i>Journal of European Public Policy</i>, 1-23; online first.
<p>26.10 Room S11</p>	<p style="text-align: center;"><u>Business Power I</u></p> <p>Compulsory reading:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Culpepper, P.D. (2010): <i>Quiet Politics and Business Power: Corporate Control in Europe and Japan</i>. Cambridge University Press. 177-98. • Culpepper, P.D. (2015): Structural Power and Political Science in the Post-Crisis Era. <i>Business and Politics</i> 17(3), 391-409. <p>Presentation_3_NN:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Culpepper, P.D., Reinke, R. (2014): Structural Power and Bank Bailouts in the United Kingdom and the United States. <i>Politics & Society</i> 42(4), 427-454. <p>Presentation_4_NN:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Young, K. (2015): Not by Structure Alone: Power, Prominence, and Agency in American Finance. <i>Business and Politics</i> 17(3), 443-472.
<p>02.11 Room S11</p>	<p style="text-align: center;"><u>Business Power II</u></p> <p>Compulsory reading:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Culpepper, P.D. (2021): Quiet Politics in Tumultuous Times: Business Power, Populism, and Democracy. <i>Politics & Society</i> 49(1), 133-143 <p>Presentation_5_NN:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Feldmann, M., Morgan, G. (2021). Brexit and British Business Elites: Business Power and Noisy Politics. <i>Politics & Society</i> 49(1), 107-131. <p>Presentation_6_NN:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Bohle, D., & Regan, A. (2021). The comparative political economy of growth models: Explaining the continuity of FDI-led growth in Ireland and Hungary. <i>Politics & Society</i> 49(1), 75-106.

<p>09.11 Room S11</p>	<p style="text-align: center;"><u>Business Power & The State</u></p> <p>Compulsory reading:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Mann, M. (1984): The Autonomous Power of the State: Its Origins, Mechanisms and Results. <i>European Journal of Sociology</i> 25(2), 185-213. <p>Presentation_7_NN:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Braun, B. (2020): Central Banking and the Infrastructural Power of Finance: The Case of ECB Support for Repo and Securitization Markets. <i>Socio-Economic Review</i> 18(2), 395–418. <p>Presentation_8_NN:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Weiss, L., Thurbon, E. (2018). Power Paradox: How the Extension of US Infrastructural Power Abroad Diminishes State Capacity at Home. <i>Review of International Political Economy</i> 25(6), 779-810.
<p>16.11 Room S11</p>	<p style="text-align: center;"><u>Power & International Political Economy</u></p> <p>Compulsory reading:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Barnett, M., Duvall, R. (2005): Power in International Politics. <i>International Organization</i> 59(1), 39-75. <p>Presentation_9_NN:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Malkin, A. (2020). The Made in China Challenge to US Structural Power: Industrial Policy, Intellectual Property and Multinational Corporations. <i>Review of International Political Economy</i>, 1-33; online first. <p>Presentation_10_NN:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Farrell, H., Newman, A. L. (2019). Weaponized Interdependence: How Global Economic Networks Shape State Coercion. <i>International Security</i> 44(1), 42-79.
<p>23.11 Room S11</p>	<p style="text-align: center;"><u>Lobbying & EU Policy Making</u></p> <p>Compulsory reading:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Buena, A., Ibenskas, R. (2015): Quantitative Text Analysis and the Study of EU Lobbying and Interest Groups. <i>European Union Politics</i>, 16(3), 429–455. & Klüver, H. (2015): The Promises of Quantitative Text Analysis in Interest Group Research: A Reply to Buena and Ibenskas. <i>European Union Politics</i>, 16(3), 456–466. <p>Presentation_11_NN:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Kalyanpur, N., Newman, A.L. (2019): The MNC-Coalition Paradox: Issue Salience, Foreign Firms and the General Data Protection Regulation. <i>Journal of Common Market Studies</i> 57(3), 448-467. <p>Presentation_12_NN:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • De Bruycker, I., & Beyers, J. (2019): Lobbying Strategies and Success: Inside and Outside Lobbying in European Union Legislative Politics. <i>European Political Science Review</i> 11(1), 57-74.
<p>30.11 Room S11</p>	<p style="text-align: center;"><u>Power & Finance</u></p> <p>Compulsory reading:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Young, K.L., Marple, T., Heilman, J. (2017): Beyond the Revolving Door: Advocacy Behavior and Social Distance to Financial Regulators. <i>Business and Politics</i> 19(2), 327-364. <p>Presentation_13_NN:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Trampusch, C., Fastenrath, F. (2021): States’ Interests as Limits to the Power of Finance: Regulatory Reforms in Early Local Government. <i>Regulation & Governance</i> 15(2), 245-261. <p>Presentation_14_NN:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Bell, S., Hindmoor, A. (2016): Structural Power and the Politics of Bank Capital Regulation in the United Kingdom. <i>Political Studies</i>, 65(1), 103-121.

<p>07.12 Room S11</p>	<p style="text-align: center;"><u>Power & Financialization</u></p> <p>Compulsory reading:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Wittko, C. (2016): The Politics of Financialization in the United States, 1949-2005. <i>British Journal of Political Science</i> 46(2), 349-370. <p>Presentation_15_NN:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Meyer, B. (2019). Financialization, Technological Change, and Trade Union Decline. <i>Socio-Economic Review</i> 17(3), 477–502. <p>Presentation_16_NN:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Mertens, A., Trampusch, C., Fastenrath, F., Wangemann, R. (2021): The Political Economy of Local Government Financialization and the Role of Policy Diffusion. <i>Regulation & Governance</i> 15(2), 370-387.
<p>14.12 Room S11</p>	<p style="text-align: center;"><u>Power & Digital Economy I</u></p> <p>Compulsory reading:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Rahman, K.S, Thelen, K. (2019): The Rise of the Platform Business Model and the Transformation of Twenty-First-Century Capitalism. <i>Politics & Society</i> 47(2), 177-204. <p>Presentation_17_NN</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Hope, D., Martelli, A. (2019). The Transition to the Knowledge Economy, Labor Market Institutions, and Income Inequality in Advanced Democracies. <i>World Politics</i> 71(2), 236-288. <p>Presentation_18_NN:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Kemmerling, M., C. Trampusch (2021): Corporate Power Sources in the Digital(ized) Economy. Paper for the SASE Conference, July 2021.
<p>21.12 Room S11</p>	<p style="text-align: center;"><u>Power & Digital Economy II</u></p> <p>Compulsory reading:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Culpepper, P.D., Thelen, K. (2020): Are We All Amazon Primed? Consumers and the Politics of Platform Power. <i>Comparative Political Studies</i> 53(2): 288–318. <p>Presentation_19_NN:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Seidl, T., (2020): The Politics of Platform Capitalism: A Case Study on the Regulation of Uber in New York. <i>Regulation & Governance</i>, Online First <p>Presentation_20_NN:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Helmerich, N., Raj-Reichert, G., & Zajak, S. (2021): Exercising Associational and Networked power through the Use of Digital Technology by Workers in Global Value Chains. <i>Competition & Change</i> 25(2), 142-166.
<p>27.01 Room S15</p>	<p style="text-align: center;">Mini Conference Thursday, Jan. 27, 9am-4.00pm</p>