

Summer Term 2018  
**14335.0111: The Politics of Development**  
BA Seminar: Schwerpunktmodul Seminar Politikwissenschaft II  
9 ECTS points (PO2008/09)/9 ECTS points (PO2015)

Preliminary

**Dr. Sarah Berens**

Tuesdays 16.00 – 17.30  
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*Course Overview*

This course revolves around the question: Why don't poor countries catch up? Why do some countries thrive while others fail? What is the microfoundation of development? With a particular focus on (a) the crucial role of institutions and (b) the behavioral microfoundation of development we investigate which factors account for economic growth, democratization and regime stability. We study the explanatory power of factor endowments, institutions, regime type, clientelism, ethnic heterogeneity and corruption for development and growth. Taking into account historical legacies, ethnic conflicts, and natural resources, we shed light on the different components that influence the politics of development. At the micro level we zoom in on general theories of political behavior, investigating preference formation, voting behavior and political activism. We learn about the incentive structures of political elites, citizens and social groups, and reflect on challenges for cooperation. We tap into motivations for individuals to engage in protests, conflicts and revolt and study the impact of clientelism, group membership and corruption on vote choices in elections. The course will provide you with a set of micro theories and institutional theories to study and explain economic and political development. The readings span from classical work to the current research frontier, so that the course will equip you with insights into the key debates in comparative politics and political economy. Methodologically, we will come across a variety of approaches such as regression analysis, multilevel models, field experiments, laboratory experiments and qualitative case studies.

*Prerequisites*

A good knowledge of general political science concepts, theories and basic quantitative and qualitative methods is required. Students should have completed a course in statistics prior to this course so that a basic familiarity with quantitative methods, in particular linear regression analysis, can be expected. Students should be able to understand and articulate themselves in English as this will be the general classroom language. Of course, perfection is not required but you should be able to make yourself understood.

### Reading

The required reading is indicated as such, but you will also find *recommended* readings which are not required for class. The recommended readings list only serves as orientation in case that you intend to delve deeper into the particular research topic. **All readings are available electronically on Ilias.**

### Requirements

The sessions in class are designed as a very participatory seminar format. This means that the class also depends on your in-class participation. Each participant will prepare a **10 to 15 minutes presentation** based on additional material or own research on one of the seminar topics. In order to ensure the quality of participation I expect you to have prepared the required readings prior to class and to attend all meetings.

The **term paper** should bear on the themes discussed in class, be empirical in nature and contain no more than 4.500-5.000 words (approximately 15 pages). You should be clear about your theory, data and methodological approach. It is vital to develop a clear research design that supports your analytical interest. First ideas on the research question and the basic methodological approach for the term paper have to be submitted in form of a **one-page outline by June 30<sup>th</sup>** as PDF. The final term paper is due on **August 31<sup>st</sup> 2018** (24:00), the date of the electronic submission is what counts. Please submit your paper electronically as a PDF document to [sarah.berens@uni-koeln.de](mailto:sarah.berens@uni-koeln.de). Late papers will be punished. The final grade is composed of the term paper, in-class participation and the individual presentation.

In addition to the electronic paper version (which will be checked for plagiarism), please submit a paper version in the course of the week after the due date at the secretary of the [CCCP](#) (please check our homepage for opening hours). **The paper version must contain the following signed statement:**

[http://www.cccp.uni-koeln.de/fileadmin/wiso\\_fak/cccp/Lehre/ErklaerungzuArbeiten.pdf](http://www.cccp.uni-koeln.de/fileadmin/wiso_fak/cccp/Lehre/ErklaerungzuArbeiten.pdf)

### Registration

Registration takes place via KLIPS. I strongly recommend registration as this ensures that you may get information about ad hoc changes in the schedule.

## I. THE INSTITUTIONAL LOGIC OF DEVELOPMENT

### 1. April 10<sup>th</sup> 2018

#### **Introduction**

Keefer, P. and S. Knack (1997): Why Don't Poor Countries Catch Up? A Cross-National Test Of An Institutional Explanation. *Economic Inquiry*, Vol. XXXV: 590-602.

Acemoglu, D. and J. Robinson (2012), *Why Nations Fail*: Chapters 1-2 (pp. 7-69).

#### *Recommended:*

Sen, Amartya. 1999. *Development as Freedom*. Chapters 1-2 (pp. 3-53).

### 2. April 17<sup>th</sup> 2018

#### **Institutions, Development and Democracy**

North, Douglass C. and Barry R. Weingast. (1989) "Constitutions and Commitment: The Evolution of Institutions Governing Public Choice in Seventeenth-Century England", *Journal of Economic History* 49: 803-32.

Acemoglu, D. and J. Robinson, (2012) *Why Nations Fail*: Chapter 3 (pp. 70-95).

*Recommended reading:*

Ross, Michael L. (2006) "Is Democracy Good for the Poor?", *American Journal of Political Science* 50: 860-74.

3. April 24th 2018

**Institutions and Economic Development**

Glaeser, E., La Porta R., Lopez-de-Silanes F, Shleifer A. (2004) "Do Institutions Cause Growth?" *Journal of Economic Growth* 9: 271-303.

*Recommended:*

Adam Przeworski. 2004. "Institutions Matter?" *Government and Opposition*. 39, 4: 527-40.

Stasavage, David and Robin Harding. 2014. "What Democracy Does (and Doesn't Do) for Basic Services: School Fees, School Inputs, and African Elections." *The Journal of Politics* 76: 229-245.

Baum, Matthew A., and David A. Lake. (2003) "The Political Economy of Growth: Democracy and Human Capital", *American Journal of Political Science* 47: 333-47.

4. May 1st 2018: Labor Day – No class!!

5. May 8th 2018

**Natural Resources, Endowments and Development**

Easterly William and Ross Levine. 2003. "Tropics, Germs, and Crops: How Endowments Influence Economic Development", *Journal of Monetary Economics*, 3-40.

Engerman, Stanley L. and Kenneth L. Sokoloff. 2002. "Factor Endowments, Inequality, and Paths of Development among New World Economies." *Economía* 3: 41-109

6. May 15th 2018

**Historical Legacies: Macro**

Acemoglu, Daron, Simon Johnson, and James A. Robinson (2001) "The Colonial Origins of Comparative Development. An Empirical Investigation," *American Economic Review*, Vol. 91, 5: 1369-1401.

Acemoglu and Robinson, (2012) *Why Nations Fail*: Chapter 4 (pp. 96-123).

*Recommended:*

Dell, Melissa (2010) "The persistent effects of Peru's mining mita." *Econometrica* 78.6: 1863-1903.

Kuran, Timur (2004) "Why the Middle East is economically underdeveloped: historical mechanisms of institutional stagnation", *Journal of Economic Perspectives* 18: 71-90.

7. May 22nd 2018 - no class, Pfingsten!

8. May 29th 2018

**Economic Performance and Regime Stability**

Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, James D. Morrow, Randolph Siverson, and Alastair Smith, (2001) "Political Competition and Economic Growth," *Journal of Democracy* 12(1): 58-72.

John McMillan and Pablo Zoido, "How to Subvert Democracy: Montesinos in Peru," *Journal of Economic Perspectives* (Fall 2004): 69-92.

9. June 5th 2018

**Democratization**

Lindberg, Staffan (2006) "The Surprising Significance of African Elections," *Journal of Democracy* 17(1): 139-151.

Fearon, James (1999) "Electoral Accountability and the Control of Politicians" in *Democracy, Accountability, and Representation* edited by Adam Przeworski, Susan Stokes and Bernard Manin. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press: pp. 55-97.

## II. THE BEHAVIORAL LOGIC OF DEVELOPMENT

10. June 12<sup>th</sup> 2018

### **Historical Legacies: Micro**

Peisakhin, Leonid, and Noam Lupu (2017). "The Legacy of Political Violence Across Generations." *American Journal of Political Science*, (forthcoming) DOI: 10.1111/ajps.12327

Blattman, Christopher (2009) "From Violence to Voting: War and political participation in Uganda." *American Political Science Review* 103(2): 231-247.

#### *Recommended:*

Balcells, Laia (2012) "The consequences of victimization on political identities: Evidence from Spain." *Politics & Society* 40.3: 311-347.

Nunn, Nathan, and Leonard Wantchekon (2011) "The Slave Trade and the Origins of Mistrust in Africa." *American Economic Review* 101(7): pp. 3221-3252.

Jha, Saumitra, and Steven Wilkinson (2012) "Does Combat Experience Foster Organizational Skill? Evidence from Ethnic Cleansing during the Partition of South Asia." *American Political Science Review* 106(4): pp. 883-907.

11. June 19<sup>th</sup> 2018

### **Violence and Instability**

Humphreys, Macartan, and Jeremy Weinstein (2008) "Who fights? The determinants of participation in civil war." *American Journal of Political Science* 52(2): 436-455.

Dube, Oeindrila, and Juan Vargas (2012) "Commodity Price Shocks and Civil Conflict: Evidence from Colombia" *Review of Economic Studies*, 80(4): 1384–1421.

#### *Recommended:*

Kalyvas, Stathis, and Matthew Kocher. 2007. "How 'Free' Is Free Riding in Civil Wars? Violence, Insurgency and the Collective Action Problem." *World Politics* 59(January): 177–216.

Blattman, Christopher, Julian C. Jamison, and Margaret Sheridan (2017) "Reducing crime and violence: Experimental evidence from cognitive behavioral therapy in Liberia." *American Economic Review* 107(4): 1165-1206.

12. June 26<sup>th</sup> 2018

### **Ethnicity**

Habyarimana, James, Macartan Humphreys, Daniel Posner, and Jeremy Weinstein (2007) "Why Does Ethnic Diversity Undermine Public Goods Provision? An Experimental Approach." *American Political Science Review* 101(4): 709-725.

Lieberman, Evan (2007) "Ethnic politics, risk, and policy-making: A cross-national statistical analysis of government responses to HIV/AIDS." *Comparative Political Studies*, 40(12): 1407–1432.

#### *Recommended:*

Chandra, Kanchan (2006) "Counting heads: a theory of voter and elite behavior in patronage democracies" In *Patrons, Clients and Policies: Patterns of Democratic Accountability and Political Competition*, eds. Kitschelt, Herbert, and Steven I. Wilkinson.

Chandra, K. (2006) What is ethnicity and does it matter? *Annual Review of Political Science*, 9, 397-424.

13. July 3<sup>rd</sup> 2018

**Clientelism**

Stokes, S. C. (2005) Perverse accountability: A formal model of machine politics with evidence from Argentina. *American Political Science Review* 99 (3), 315-25.

*Recommended:*

Nichter, S. (2008) Vote Buying or Turnout Buying? Machine Politics and the Secret Ballot. *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 102: 19-31.

Auyero, J. (1999) "From the client's point(s) of view": How poor people perceive and evaluate political clientelism. *Theory and Society*, Vol. 28: 297-334.

Magaloni, Beatriz, Diaz-Cayeros, Alberto, and Estévez, Federico (2007): *Clientelism and Portfolio Diversification: A Model of Electoral Investment with Applications to Mexico*. In Herbert Kitschelt and Steven I. Wilkinson (Eds.): *Patrons, Clients, and Policies. Patterns of Democratic Accountability and Political Competition*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 182-205.

14. July 10<sup>th</sup> 2018

**Corruption**

Rose-Ackerman S. (1999) Political corruption and democracy. *Conn. J. Int. Law* 14(2): 363–78.

Winters MS, Weitz-Shapiro R. (2013) Lacking information or condoning corruption: When do voters support corrupt politicians? *Comparative Politics*, 45(4):418–36.

*Recommended:*

Catherine E. De Vries and Hector Solaz (2017) The Electoral Consequences of Corruption *Annu. Rev. Polit. Sci.* Vol 20: 391–408.

Mauro P. (1995) Corruption and growth. *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 110(3): 681–712.

15. July 17<sup>th</sup> 2018

**Discussion of term papers**