

1399: Distributive Politics

Tuesdays, 17:45-19:15
6 ECTS points

[106 Seminargebäude](#)
Universitätsstraße 35
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Outline of the Course

Distributive politics characterize the allocation of public goods and services (e. g. health care, education, social security, but also particularistic goods) to individuals or groups and are based on taxes and transfers. Wealth and resources are, however, unequally distributed in society. The question that distributive politics consequently address asks: who gets what, who benefits – who loses? Distributive politics illustrate the very heart of politics and a vibrant field of research which just gained new momentum in the last years. We will study principles of resource allocation from political actors (parties) to individuals (voters), considering the electoral payoff for political parties and voters. Which groups are targeted by political parties with public goods provision: core or swing voters, the rich or the poor, the median voter or particular groups (clients), the winning coalition or the selectorate? We will start with the discussion of classical concepts and theories before we move towards the analysis of current issues in this field of research in the course of the seminar.

Distributive politics refer to two central aspects in the political sphere: 1) political accountability and 2) political responsiveness. The first aspect studies how far voters are able to hold political actors accountable for their actions and, thus, takes into account the political consequences of distributive politics (e. g. political survival, distributive conflict). The latter considers the redistributive effect of distributive politics. Do these policies reflect the demand of the voters (mostly, the median voter) or rather particular groups, and do they maximize welfare? The main focus of the seminar rests on the former question (section I-III). We will start with the clarification of classical concepts and theories of distributive politics (**I**) and address the usage of *pork barrel* politics in the case of the U.S. In **section II** we study income inequality and distributive conflicts that emerge from unequal distribution of wealth (e. g. in democratic and non-democratic countries). In **section III** we move on to distributive politics that are based on favoritism: political clientelism. Here, we study the effects of vote buying and patronage on political accountability and political participation with a particular focus on the case of Argentina (vote buying) and Asia (patronage). Finally, in **section IV** we investigate the redistributive effects of clientelistic resource allocation in the case of Mexico and Indonesia. The goal of the seminar is to establish a genuine understanding for the most crucial question in comparative politics: how public goods are distributed in society. The seminar provides participants with a broad set of

classical political economy theories, examples from the research frontier on distributive politics and a range of research designs and methodological approaches to draw upon for own research in the field of comparative politics and political economy.

Prerequisites

A good knowledge of general political science concepts, theories and basic quantitative and qualitative methods is required. Students should be able to understand and articulate themselves in English as this will be the general classroom language. Of course, perfection is not required but you should be able to make yourself understood. The term paper should be written in English as well.

Requirements

The sessions in class are designed as a very participatory seminar format. This means that the class also depends on your in-class participation. In order to ensure the quality of participation I expect you to have prepared the required readings prior to class and to attend all meetings. The required reading is indicated as such, but you will also find *recommended* readings which are not required for class. The recommended readings list only serves as orientation in case that you intend to delve deeper into the particular research topic. A **reader with the required texts** for the sessions of the seminar can be bought at Copy Star (Zülpicher Straße 184, 50937 Cologne) at the beginning of October.

The term paper should bear on the themes discussed in class and contain no more than 5.000 words (approximately 15-20 pages). You should be clear about your theory, data and methodological approach. It is vital to develop a clear research design that supports your analytical interest. The paper is due on **March 3rd 2015** (24:00). Late papers will be punished. The final grade is composed of the term paper (80%) and in-class participation (20%).

Registration

Please register via KLIPS. If you cannot use KLIPS, please register by sending me an email (sarah.berens@uni-koeln.de).

Basic Reading Recommendations (optional)

Przeworski, A., Stokes, S. and Manin, B. (1999) *Democracy, Accountability and Representation*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Acemoglu, D. and J. Robinson (2005) *The Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Kitschelt, H. and Wilkinson, S. I. (2007) *Patrons, Clients, and Policies: Patterns of Democratic Accountability and Political Competition*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

I FUNDAMENTALS

07.10.2014

1. Introduction

Stokes, S. (2007) Political Clientelism, in: C. Boix and S. Stokes (eds.) *Handbook of Comparative Politics* Oxford University Press.

Golden, M. and Min, (2013) Distributive Politics Around the World. *American Review of Political Science*.

Recommended:

Hopkin (2006) Conceptualizing Political Clientelism: Political Exchange and Democratic Theory. Unpublished Manuscript, 1-19.

14.10.2014

2. Accountability and Representation

Przeworski, A., Stokes, S. and Manin, B. (1999) Democracy, Accountability and Representation. Cambridge University Press, Introduction + Chp. 1 (54 pages).

21.10.2014

3. Core versus Swing Voters

Cox, G., McDubbins, (1986) Electoral Politics as Redistributive Game. *Journal of Politics*, Vol. 48: 370-389.

Dixit, A. and Londregan, J. (1996) "The Determinants of Success of Special Interests in Redistributive Politics" *Journal of Politics*, Vol. 58: 1132-55.

28.10.2014

4. Political Competition and Political Survival

Bueno de Mesquita, B., Smith, A., Siverson, R. M., and J. D. Morrow (2003). *The Logic of Political Survival*, MIT Press. Chp. 1+2.

04.11.2014

5. Pork-barrel Politics in the United States

Levitt, S. D. and Snyder, J. (1997) The Impact of Federal Spending on House Election Outcomes. *Journal of Political Economy*, Vol. 105, No. 1: 30-53.

Wilson, R. K. (1986) An Empirical Test of Preferences for the Political Pork Barrel: District Level Appropriations for River and Harbor Legislation, 1889-1913. *American Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 30, No. 4: 729-754.

Recommended:

Shepsle, K. A. and Weingast, B. R. (1981) Political Preferences for the Pork Barrel: A Generalization. *American Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 25, No. 1: 96-111.

II INCOME INEQUALITY AND DISTRIBUTIVE CONFLICTS

11.11.2014

6. Income Inequality and Economic Development

William Easterly. (2007) "Inequality Does Cause Underdevelopment" *Journal of Development Economics*, Vol. 84: 755-776.

Milanovic, B. (2005) *Worlds Apart: Measuring International and Global Inequality*. Princeton: Princeton University Press. (Pages 7-50)

Recommended:

Sokoloff, K. L. and S. L. Engerman (2000) History Lessons: Institutions, Factor Endowments, and Paths of Development in the New World. *Journal of Economic Perspectives*, Vo. 14, No. 3: 217-232.

18.11.2014

7. Income Inequality and Distributive Conflict

Acemoglu, D. and J. Robinson (2005) *The Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Chp. 1+2 + 8 (approximately 70 pages)

25.11.2014

8. Redistribution and Social Policy

Dixit, A. and J. Londregan (1998) Ideology, Tactics, and Efficiency in Redistributive Politics, *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 497-529.

Milanovic (2000) The median-voter hypothesis, income inequality, and income redistribution: an empirical test with the required data. *European Journal of Political Economy*, Vol. 16: 367-410.

02.12.2014

9. Ethnicity and Distributive Politics

Habyarimana, J., Humphreys, M., Posner, D. N., and Weinstein, J. M. (2007) Why Does Ethnic Diversity Undermine Public Goods Provision? *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 101, No. 4: 709-725.

Kasara, K. (2007) Tax me if you can: Ethnic Geography, Democracy, and the Taxation of Agriculture in Africa. *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 101, No. 1: 159-172.

Recommended:

Humphreys, M. and Weinstein, J. M. (2009) Field Experiments and the Political Economy of Development. *American Review of Political Science*.

http://www.columbia.edu/~mh2245/papers1/HW_ARPS09.pdf

Baldwin, K. and J. D. Huber (2010) Economic versus Cultural Differences: Forms of Ethnic Diversity and Public Goods Provision, *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 104.

III. DISTRIBUTIVE POLITICS AND CLIENTELISM

09.12.2014

10. Clientelism, Democracy and Concept Clarification

Hilgers, T. (2012) Democratic Processes, Clientelistic Relationships and the Material Goods Problem. Pp- 1-22 in: T. Hilgers ed. *Clientelism in Everyday Latin American Politics*, New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Schaffer (2007) *Elections for Sale: The Causes and Consequences of Vote Buying*, Manila: Ateneo De Manila University Press. Chp. 1+2. (30 pages)

16.12.2014

11. Vote-buying and Distributive Politics

Stokes, S. C. (2005) Perverse accountability: A formal model of machine politics with evidence from Argentina. *American Political Science Review* 99 (3), 315-25.

Nichter, S. (2008) Vote Buying or Turnout Buying? Machine Politics and the Secret Ballot. *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 102: 19-31.

Recommended:

Jensen, P. and M. Justensen (2014) Poverty and vote buying: Survey-based evidence from Africa. *Electoral Studies*, Vol. 33: 220-232.

13.01.2015

12. Patronage and Distributive Politics

Ernesto Calvo and Maria Victoria Murillo, "Who Delivers? Partisan Clients in the Argentine Electoral Market," *American Journal of Political Science* 48 (Oct. 2004): 742-57.

Hutchcroft, P. D. (2014) Linking Capital and Countryside: Patronage and Clientelism in Japan, Thailand, and the Philippines, pp. 174-203 in: Diego Abente Brun and Larry Diamond (Eds.) *Clientelism, Social Policy, and the Quality of Democracy*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.

IV: POLICY RESPONSIVENESS: REDISTRIBUTIVE CONSEQUENCES OF PUBLIC GOODS ALLOCATION

20.01.2015

13. Clientelism and Public Goods Provision

Diaz-Cayeros, A., Estévez, F. and B. Magaloni (2012) *Strategies of Vote Buying: Democracy, Clientelism and Poverty Relief in Mexico*. Unpublished manuscript. Chp. 7+ 8 (60 pages)

De la O, A. (2013) Do Conditional Cash Transfers Affect Electoral Behavior? Evidence from a Randomized Experiment in Mexico, *American Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 57: 1-14.

27.01.2015

14. Political Participation and Distributive Politics

Olken (2010): Direct Democracy and Local Public Goods: Evidence from a Field Experiment in Indonesia, *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 104: 243-267.

Paler (2013) Keeping the Public Purse: An Experiment in Windfalls, Taxes, and the Incentives to Restrain Government, *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 107: 706-725.

03.02.2015

15. Final Discussion and Paper Presentation

Auyero, J. (1999) "From the client's point(s) of view": How poor people perceive and evaluate political clientelism. *Theory and Society*, Vol. 28: 297-334.