# Winter Term 2012/13

#### Dr. Jan Sauermann

# (1405) The Limits of Democracy: Social Choice Theory and its Critics

*Time:* Thursdays 8:00 – 9:30

Room: Gottfried-Keller-Str.6, Hörsaal des Forschungsinstituts

First Session: 11 October 2012

### Course description

Is there a public good? Can it be revealed by democratic procedures? The course will focus on these fundamental questions through the lens of social choice theory. In his highly influential book 'Liberalism against Populism' William Riker argues that democratic decisions are chaotic, meaningless, and arbitrary. The seminar consists of two parts. In the first part of the seminar we will examine Riker's line of argumentation in detail. In the second part we will analyse alternatives from democratic theory trying to defend democracy against Riker's pessimistic interpretation of social choice theory.

### **Prerequisites**

Students should have a good knowledge of political science concepts, basic qualitative and quantitative methods, and an interest in current research. Since nearly all reading assignments are in English, this will be the general classroom language as well. Participants therefore must know enough English to be able to participate actively. Perfection is not required – you just need to understand and make yourself understood.

# Relevance for study programmes

The course is open to all doctoral students and advanced master/diploma students of the WiSo-Faculty with an interest in political science.

# Registration

The course will be taught on a weekly basis (first session October 11). Students should register via KLIPS. Students unable to use KLIPS can register via Email (jan.sauermann@uni-koeln.de).

### Reading assignments

At the beginning of October a reader with the required texts for the sessions of the seminar will be made available to participants at the chair.

# Working requirements and assessment method

All participants are expected to:

- attend the seminar on a regular basis
- complete assigned readings according to schedule
- actively contribute to class discussions
- give a 10 to 15 minutes presentation in the seminar

Depending on the "Prüfungsordnung"

- EITHER write a research paper of 15-20 pages in length (Deadline: 18 March 2013, 12:00)

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- OR sit a written exam

### **General readings:**

- Hinich, Melvin J., and Michael C. Munger. 1997. Analytical Politics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Mueller, Dennis C. 2003. Public Choice III. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Shepsle, Kenneth A., and Mark S. Bonchek. 1997. *Analyzing Politics. Rationality, Behavior, and Institutions*. New York and London: W. W. Norton & Company.

### Schedule

#### 11 October 2012 Introduction

# Required readings:

 Shapiro, Ian. 2003. The State of Democratic Theory. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1-34.

### 18 October 2012 Rational choice theory

### Required readings:

Opp, Karl-Dieter. 1999. "Contending Conceptions of the Theory of Rational Action." Journal
of Theoretical Politics 11 (2): 171-202.

### Optional readings:

 Frohlich, Norman, and Joe A. Oppenheimer. 2006. "Skating on Thin Ice. Cracks in the Public Choice Foundation." *Journal of Theoretical Politics* 18 (3): 235-266.

### 25 October 2012 Riker I

### Required readings:

 Riker, William H. 1982. Liberalism against Populism. A Confrontation between the Theory of Democracy and the Theory of Social Choice. Long Grove: Waveland Press, 1-64.

### 8 November 2012 Riker II: The Arrow-problem

### Required readings:

 Riker, William H. 1982. Liberalism against Populism. A Confrontation between the Theory of Democracy and the Theory of Social Choice. Long Grove: Waveland Press, 65-136.

#### Optional readings:

• Mueller, Dennis C. 2003. *Public Choice III*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 582-596.

### 15 November 2012 Riker III: Strategic voting and agenda control

#### Required readings:

 Riker, William H. 1982. Liberalism against Populism. A Confrontation between the Theory of Democracy and the Theory of Social Choice. Long Grove: Waveland Press, 137-195.

#### Optional readings:

Mueller, Dennis C. 2003. Public Choice III. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 79-127.

# 22 November 2012 Riker IV: Political disequilibrium

### Required readings:

- Riker, William H. 1982. Liberalism against Populism. A Confrontation between the Theory of Democracy and the Theory of Social Choice. Long Grove: Waveland Press, 197-232.
- Riker, William H. 1980. "Implications from the Disequilibrium of Majority Rule for the Study of Institutions." American Political Science Review 74: 432-446.

### 29 November 2012 Riker's conception of democracy

### Required readings:

- Riker, William H. 1982. Liberalism against Populism. A Confrontation between the Theory of Democracy and the Theory of Social Choice. Long Grove: Waveland Press, 233-253.
- Radcliff, Benjamin. 1993. "Liberalism, Populism, and Collective Choice." Political Science Quarterly 46 (1): 127-42.

### 6 December 2012 Mackie I: Defending democracy from social choice

### Required readings:

• Mackie, Gerry. 2003. Democracy Defended. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1-71.

# 13 December 2012 Mackie II: Unrestricted domain of preferences

### Required readings:

- Mackie, Gerry. 2003. Democracy Defended. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 95-122.
- Sauermann, Jan, and André Kaiser. 2010. "Taking Others into Account: Self-Interest and Fairness in Majority Decision Making." American Journal of Political Science 54 (3): 667-685.

### Optional readings:

 Frohlich, Norman, and Joe A. Oppenheimer. 2007. "Justice Preferences and the Arrow Problem." Journal of Theoretical Politics 19 (4): 363-390.

### 20 December 2012 Mackie III: Strategic voting

### Required readings:

- Mackie, Gerry. 2003. Democracy Defended. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 158-172.
- Dowding, Keith, and Martin van Hees. 2007. "In Praise of Manipulation." British Journal of Political Science 38 (1): 1-15.

# 10 January 2013 Mackie IV: Multidimensional chaos

### Required readings:

- Mackie, Gerry. 2003. Democracy Defended. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 173-196.
- Bianco, William T., Michael S. Lynch, Gary J. Miller, and Itai Sened. 2006. ""A Theory Waiting to Be Discoverd and Used": A Reanalysis of Canonical Experiments on Majority Rule Decision-Making." *Journal of Politics* 68 (4): 838-51.

### Optional readings:

- Miller, Gary J. 2011. "Legislative Voting and Cycling." In Cambridge Handbook of Experimental Political Science, eds. James N. Druckman, Donald P. Green, James H. Kuklinski and Arthur Lupia. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 353-368.
- Fiorina, Morris P., and Charles R. Plott. 1978. "Committee Decisions under Majority Rule: An Experimental Study." American Political Science Review 72 (2): 575-598.

### 17 January 2013 Mackie vs. Riker

### Required readings:

Mackie, Gerry. 2003. Democracy Defended. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 378-431.

### Optional readings:

 Dowding, Keith. 2006. "Can Populism Be Defended? William Riker, Gerry Mackie and the Interpretation of Democracy." Government and Opposition 41 (3): 327-46.

#### 24 January 2013 Social choice and deliberation

#### Required readings:

- Goodin, Robert E. 1986. "Laundering Preferences." In Foundations of Social Choice Theory, eds. Jon Elster and Aanund Hylland. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 75-101.
- Dryzek, John S., and Christian List. 2003. "Social Choice Theory and Deliberative Democracy: A Reconciliation." British Journal of Political Science 33 (1): 1-28.

### 31 January 2013 Social choice and pluralism

### Required readings:

- Miller, Nicholas. 1983. "Pluralism and Social Choice." American Political Science Review 77
  (3): 734-747.
- McGann, Anthony J. 2004. "The Tyranny of the Supermajority. How Majority Rule Protects Minorities." Journal of Theoretical Politics 16 (1): 53-77.